Message Matters

Benghazi Fantasies

SUMMARY: Congressional Republicans and their right wing allies are trying to spin the Obama Administration's response to the Benghazi attack into a scandal in their efforts to take down the Obama Administration. They are even pouncing on the botched  ABC News report that only rehashed old discussions and revealed to the shock of no one that federal agencies coordinate on sensitive national security matters. Push back and put the conspiracy theorists on the defensive.



Most of the conspiracies alleged in this debate are variations of these two:
(1) The Administration supposedly deliberately allowed the Benghazi facility to be attacked and overrun.

(2) The Administration then supposedly covered up the involvement of terrorists to avoid political embarrassment before the election.

Note that because the motives ascribed to the President in these two conspiracy theories contradict each other: the President was either mortified by the terrorists' success, or he wanted them to succeed. Republican scandalmongers in Congress need to make up their minds -- or admit that both conspiracy theories are nothing more.


FACT: The Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Ed Royce, stated that the Board "severely critiques a handful of individuals, and they have been held accountable" for their decisions contributing to inadequate security at Benghazi.

FACT: The Pickering report warns that to make diplomatic security adequate, "The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to support State Department needs" -- which Republican lawmakers refused to do before the Benghazi attacks.

FACT: According to the Pickering report's assessment of the Administration's response to the attack, "The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference."

FACT: In the days right after the attack, President Obama repeatedly called it an "act of terror." Even in the immediate aftermath of the Benghazi attack, Administration officials, including Ambassador Rice in her Sunday show appearances, openly discussed the possible involvement of extremist groups, including those linked to Al Qaeda, might have been responsible.

FACT: Once Pickering saw the true goal of the Issa hearings, he changed his mind and sought to testify after all, but Issa refused to waive an obscure three-day rule of the committee he chairs to allow it.


ATTACK: "The Obama Administration's handling of Benghazi is bigger than Watergate -- it deliberately misled the American people."

ATTACK: "An 'exclusive' ABC News report shows that the State Department manipulated the CIA's Benghazi talking points for Ambassador Rice for political reasons."

ATTACK: "In their media appearances right after the Benghazi attack, Administration officials like Ambassador Rice misleadingly said that it wasn't terrorism."

ATTACK: "The President failed to save American lives by withholding military help from the Benghazi diplomatic outpost."

ATTACK: "Secretary Clinton failed to save American lives by personally denying requests for additional security in Benghazi and during the attack cut the State Department's antiterrorism unit out of the loop."

ATTACK: "The Obama Administration's handling of the Benghazi attack was a failure of leadership for not anticipating an attack on September 11."

ATTACK: "The House Republicans' Benghazi hearings are not political."

ATTACK: "The Obama Administration threatened and retaliated against people who came forward to testify in this week's hearings."


The full Pickering report is available at; the report summary is below. If you are on a smartphone, here is the link to Google's cached version. The bold emphasis in the text is our own.


A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012, resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel, Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; seriously wounded two other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex.


In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi determined that:

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two separate facilities - the SMC and the Annex - and en route between them. Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department (the "Department") resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a "shared responsibility" by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi's staffing, with talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.

Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related requests, especially those relating to staffing.

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows, concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense Notification System.

Special Mission Benghazi's uncertain future after 2012 and its "non-status" as a temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the working-level in the field, with very limited resources.

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post, Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was inadequate. At the same time, the SMC's dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs' Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was misplaced.

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador Stevens' visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible threats against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11 anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken the anniversary into account and decided to hold all meetings on-compound on September 11.

The Board found that Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to Benghazi independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his trip was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador's trip provided for minimal close protection security support and were not shared thoroughly with the Embassy's country team, who were not fully aware of planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels. Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed attackers.

The Board found the responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be inadequate. The Board's inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.

The Board found the Libyan government's response to be profoundly lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and near absence of central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to Tripoli on September 12.

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith. The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community's understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.

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